Conference paper abstract, A. Theodore Izmaylov, 2024.
Keywords: Durkheim; individualism–holism debate; complexity theory; social change; philosophy of social science; science education.
In the ongoing individualism-holism debate in the philosophy of social sciences (Zahle & Collin, 2014), it is still widely accepted that the issue of political individualism is theoretically separable and a practically separate one (Udehn, 2001). Despite the rampant politically individualistic presuppositions and implications of the most successful methodologically individualist accounts – for example, Schelling’s (1971) paradigmatic model of racial residential segregation and its reception (Risjord, 2014), which purposefully and explicitly dismisses any role of social at the outset but then is seen as bases for individualistic worldview in a feat of circular logic - it is somehow still thought that such theoretical position and worldviews informed by them in no way affect the strength of identification with community and aspirations for common good.
I argue that Durkheim’s sui generis position offers an original holistic take on all these issues, but its novelty, cohesion and relevance are still largely underappreciated (Jones, 2001). Durkheim’s methodological and theoretical views on individual vs social are heavily criticized for being incoherent at best (Likes, 2013) or spiritualist and dualist at worst, but sometimes, conversely, argued to be identical to modern supervenience and emergentist views (Sawyer, 2002; 2020). His methodological holism in sociology is informed by his position as a philosopher of science proper. He repeatedly emphasizes that empirically observable complexity of social and mental, as well as many natural phenomena, can not be reduced to abstract mathematical models with a few elements.
Durkheim (1961) called out the ‘unconscious Cartesian thinking’, ‘naive’ and ‘abstract simplicism’ borrowed from natural sciences of the past for being outdated and inadequate for modern challenges while highlighting that contemporary natural sciences are forced to embrace sui generis approaches. Inter alia, Durkheim (2013) offers a striking critique of the theoretical models of political economy for being too abstract and simplistic to be empirically adequate, which is anachronistically very relevant to modern social models and simulations (Epstein, 2006). Being the leading approach to scientific education in schools and onwards, this naive simplicism prevents not only lay people and scientists from perceiving natural and social reality in all its complexity but also promotes atomistic and individualistic thinking and effectively impedes moral education and the ability to identify with and work for the good of the community.
I show how, taken together and closely examined, Durkheim’s positions on the methodology of social sciences, philosophy of science, scientific education, and political practice clarify and reinforce each other. Philosophically, his sui generis approach has little to do with modern simplistic and abstract models of emergence and supervenience, which are still individualistic and atomistic at their core. Methodologically, his complexity theory reveals how and why sciences are not and can not be done reductively and offers a distinct alternative to both holism-emergentism and individualism. Politically, Durkheim gives us a unique insight into how particular modes of science education can impede or promote identification with community and social change.
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Durkheim, É. (2010). Individual and Collective Representations. In D. F. Pocock (Trans.), Sociology and philosophy (pp. 1–15). Routledge. (Original work published 1898)
Durkheim, É. (2010). Sociology and Philosophy (D. F. Pocock, Ed.). Routledge. (Original work published 1951)
Durkheim, É. (2013). Durkheim: The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method (S. Lukes, Ed.; W. D. Halls, Trans.; Second edition.). Palgrave Macmillan; Library Hub Discover.
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Lukes, S. (2013). Introduction to This Edition. In S. Lukes (Ed.), & W. D. Halls (Trans.), Durkheim: The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method (Second edition., pp. xi–xxxv). Palgrave Macmillan; Library Hub Discover.
Risjord, M. (2014). Philosophy of social science: A contemporary introduction. Routledge.
Sawyer, R. K. (2002). Durkheim’s Dilemma: Toward a Sociology of Emergence. Sociological Theory, 20(2), Article 2.
Sawyer, R. K. (2022). On the Autonomy of Social and Mental Entities: A Paraphrased Translation of ‘Individual and Collective Representations’. In G. Fitzi & N. Marcucci (Eds.), The Anthem Companion to Émile Durkheim (pp. 29–50). Anthem Press.
Schelling, T. C. (1971). Dynamic Models of Segregation†. The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1(2), 143–186.
Udehn, L. (2001). Methodological Individualism: Background, History and Meaning. Routledge.
Zahle, J., & Collin, F. (Eds.). (2014). Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science (Vol. 372). Springer International Publishing.
The North American Society for Social Philosophy 41st International Social Philosophy Conference: Community, Identity, and Belonging. Creighton UniversityOmaha, Nebraska. July 11, 2024. (Not presented due to visa issues)